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“But can philosophy become literature and still know itself?”1 With this pointed 
question the American philosopher Stanley Cavell famously ended his 
monumental work The Claim of Reason (1979), thereby expressing his vision for 
the relation between philosophy and literature. At the very beginning of that 
work he also, almost as famously, said that he had “wished to understand 
philosophy not as a set of problems but as a set of texts”.2 Perhaps one has to 
be familiar with the analytical tradition of philosophy to fully appreciate just 
how provocative utterances like these were at the time. Cavell himself was 
educated in this tradition and took his point of departure in ordinary language 
philosophy as developed by Wittgenstein and Austin, but already in his first 
book of essays, Must We Mean What We Say? (1969), he turned to unorthodox 
philosophical themes and launched perceptive readings of Shakespeare and 
Beckett along with essays on music and aesthetics more generally. Since then, 
that is for almost fifty years, Cavell has been working in the field between 
philosophy and literature, writing what is neither exactly philosophy nor exactly 
literary criticism as we know them, but expanding our understanding of both. 
His work is notoriously difficult to summarize because it always consists of 
meticulous close readings, regardless of whether he turns to a canonical 
philosophical text by Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard, or Heidegger or to his 
American forefathers Thoreau and Emerson, to Shakespeare and the 
romanticists or to film comedy and melodrama. It could be said, however, that 
two interrelated main concerns have inspired his work from the beginning to 
the present: One is his persistent attempt to show that philosophical skepticism, 
understood as the doubting of the existence of the external world and other 
minds, cannot and should not be refuted because it is only the intellectualization 
                                                          
1 Stanley Cavell: The Claim of Reason. Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 1979, p. 496.  
2 Ibid., p. 3.  
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of a much more fundamental uneasiness in the relation between self and world 
and self and others, a relation that he tries to capture with the dual concepts of 
avoidance and acknowledgment.3 Thus, Cavell could be said to understand 
epistemological skepticism as part of a broader existential or ethical problematic 
which he traces in his readings of Shakespeare, the romanticists, and film 
melodrama. The other main concern is Cavell’s attempt, from the 1990s 
onwards, to develop what he calls moral or Emersonian perfectionism, a 
dimension of moral thinking having to do with the education of the human soul 
which he finds represented primarily in Emerson but also in a host of other 
philosophers, writers, poets, and film-makers. Moral perfectionism is not an 
ethical theory according to Cavell because it does not exist apart from the 
readings he undertakes of specific works, and these works are as often literary 
or filmic as they are philosophical (of course, Cavell does not regard this 
distinction as settled). From this it should be clear that Cavell’s work, at least 
from Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome with the subtitle The Constitution of 
Emersonian Perfectionism (1990) onwards, is highly relevant to the philosophical 
discussion of the relation between philosophy and literature or, more 
specifically, ethics and literature, and also to the literary discussion of what has 
come to be called ‘the ethical turn’ in literary theory. I believe it could be argued 
that Cavell’s early work is just as relevant to these discussions, so that his work 
on skepticism must also be seen as a contribution to literary ethics, but it is not 
my aim to argue that here.  
Knowing full well that this short introduction to Cavell does not capture 
the pertinence of his writings, it still gives me reason to wonder why Cavell is 
not more widely read or if read, why his work is not more widely received and 
applied in the philosophy of literature and in literary criticism and/or theory. If 
Richard Eldridge is right that “arguably no other living philosopher has done 
as much as Cavell to show the common cause shared by literature and 
philosophy, where both only stand to lose by failing to acknowledge and 
                                                          
3 Encapsulating the word “knowledge”, the concept of acknowledgment is intended to imply that 
our fundamental relation to the world is not one of knowledge; as Cavell says, the world has to be 
accepted. Avoidance is the opposite of acknowledgment.  
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embrace the claims of the other”,4 then the tendency to disregard Stanley Cavell 
is strange indeed. In Cavell scholarship this has itself been thematized, giving 
rise to essays with titles like “The Avoidance of Stanley Cavell”5 or 
“Acknowledging Stanley Cavell”6 and prompting people to speculate if his 
humanism, his stressing of the human voice, and his understanding of the self 
as always to be attained, or as always becoming, in short his “strange aura of 
untimeliness”,7 has hindered a broader reception. Generally, the field 
‘philosophy and literature’ has actually been growing during the past two or 
three decades, and in the subfield ‘ethics and literature’ Martha Nussbaum, 
Richard Rorty, and Wayne Booth have been prominent voices. Nussbaum and 
Rorty have made strong cases that literature should play a central role in ethics, 
arguing that fiction, and especially novels, work on our emotions and moral 
sensibilities with the potential of turning us into more empathic and thereby 
better human beings.8 Whereas Nussbaum to some critics seems only to 
illustrate her Aristotelian ethical outlook with literary examples, Rorty is 
famously willing to go so far as to substitute philosophy with literature, but they 
coincide in having an overall instrumental approach to literature, or so the 
critique goes. From a more literary perspective, Wayne Booth has argued that 
reading fiction is per se an ethical activity, and that we stand in the same relation 
to literary works as we do to friends, so that they can be our moral examples.9 
Now, while it is clear that Cavell’s literary philosophy has affinities with these 
approaches, it is also clear that his is a less reductionist or instrumentalist 
position. Though originally coming from a philosophical background, Cavell 
has always tried to expand the philosophical canon, to make room for literature 
within philosophy, whether he argues that Shakespearean tragedy is the form 
                                                          
4 Richard Eldridge and Bernard Rhie (eds.): Stanley Cavell and Literary Studies. Consequences of 
Skepticism, Continuum, New York 2011, p. 2.  
5 Garrett Stewart, in Russell B. Goodman (ed.): Contending with Stanley Cavell, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2005, p. 140-156.  
6 Olaf Hansen, in Andrew Taylor and Áine Kelly (eds.): Stanley Cavell, Literature, and Film. The Idea of 
America, Routledge, New York 2013, p. 8-25.  
7 Eldridge and Rhie, p. 5.  
8 See Martha Nussbaum: Love’s Knowledge. Essays on Philosophy and Literature, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 1990 and Richard Rorty: Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1989.  
9 See Wayne C. Booth: The Company We Keep. An Ethics of Fiction, University of California Press, 
Berkeley 1988.  
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philosophical skepticism takes in public life, or that Ibsen’s A Doll’s House is a 
moral perfectionist work. Not knowing himself whether he addresses himself 
primarily to “addicts of philosophy or to adepts of literature”,10 and speaking in 
his highly personal and complicated diction, Cavell treats literary texts as if they 
were dealing with the same problems as philosophers, not in order to reduce 
literature to philosophy or vice versa, but in order to show that they are on a 
common mission, differences notwithstanding. It is no coincidence that Cavell 
has been called the last romantic; his treatment of Emerson’s writings as “a fair 
realization”11 of romanticism, that is, of the unification of philosophy and 
poetry, also encapsulates his own ambition for philosophy. Accordingly, Cavell 
is as keen as one could be to avoid an instrumental approach to literature, i.e. 
“impressing texts into the service of illustrating philosophical conclusions 
known in advance”,12 or, as he expands in Must We Mean What We Say?: “In 
appealing from philosophy to, for example, literature, I am not seeking 
illustrations for truths philosophy already knows, but illumination of 
philosophical pertinence that philosophy alone has not surely grasped – as 
though an essential part of its task must work behind its back. I do not 
understand such appeals as ‘going outside’ philosophy.”13  
Although Cavell does not have a theory of fiction or a theory of ethics 
apart from the exemplary readings he conducts of his chosen texts, the question 
arises how far his literary treatment of skepticism and moral perfectionism will 
take us, what their potential scope or fruitfulness is. Cavell’s model of reading 
is centered around a handful of ethically loaded concepts, most of which I have 
already mentioned, namely skepticism, avoidance, acknowledgment, the 
ordinary, the voice, and, of course, perfectionism. The question is how he 
understands these concepts and how encompassing they are. While he 
sometimes links skepticism to Nietzsche’s diagnosis of nihilism, thereby 
underscoring its breadth, it is clear that not every tragedy or every melodrama 
                                                          
10 Stanley Cavell: Disowning Knowledge. In Six Plays of Shakespeare, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1987, p. 2.  
11 Stanley Cavell: In Quest of the Ordinary. Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago 1988, p. xii.  
12 Disowning Knowledge, p. 1.  
13 Stanley Cavell: Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2002, p. xxiv-xxv.  
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has a problematic of skepticism. Likewise, even though he formulates his 
perfectionism quite broadly as having to do with the self’s realization of its 
inherent potential, and even though he, in Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, 
presents an open list with more than sixty alleged perfectionist works, it is just 
as clear that not every work of fiction is open to a perfectionist reading.14 So to 
me the interesting question becomes if it is possible to determine more generally 
which works are open to such readings. How does Cavell choose his texts? It is 
worth noticing that he has tended towards works of poetry, romanticist and 
modernist, and tragedy, not towards novels. Here, I think a case could be made 
that modernist novels often invite perfectionist readings, and to show an 
example of this I will sketch a perfectionist reading of Robert Musil’s The Man 
without Qualities (1930-32). But first I will briefly introduce to Cavell’s concept 
of moral perfectionism.  
Even though Cavell does not understand his moral perfectionism as a 
theory of ethics on a par with, for instance, Kantianism or utilitarianism, but 
rather as a dimension of moral thinking also to be found in Kant and John 
Stuart Mill, he does formulate it in opposition to these theories by saying that 
while they focus on the concepts of the right and the good, respectively, moral 
perfectionism focuses on an idea of being true to oneself or to the humanity in 
oneself. It thus has to do with the state of one’s soul and with the whole of 
one’s life rather than with particular moral choices or actions and the reasons 
for them; it takes up the old Socratic question of how one should live and 
stresses the importance of personal relationships – traditionally called 
friendship, in Cavell often called marriage – and the willingness to transform 
oneself and one’s society. This idea of transformation of the self does not entail 
that there is a final or perfected state the self should arrive at but rather that the 
self is, as it were, on a journey to itself, that it must work on itself or care for 
itself so as not to fall back into conformity or inauthenticity (to borrow a term 
from Heidegger that Cavell sometimes uses). With a focus like this it is perhaps 
not surprising that Cavell’s examples of perfectionist texts are as often literary 
as they are philosophical; while he finds perfectionist features in the works of 
                                                          
14 See Stanley Cavell: Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome. The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, 
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1990, p. 5.  
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traditional philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Mill, Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, he also finds them in authors as diverse 
as Shakespeare, Goethe, Kleist, Dostoevsky, Ibsen, Henry James, and George 
Bernard Shaw, to name only a few. And as if this diversity of texts and genres 
were not enough, Cavell identifies two genres of Hollywood films from the 
1930s and 1940s, which he calls ‘the comedy of remarriage’ and ‘the melodrama 
of the unknown woman’, where he also traces perfectionist aspirations and 
failings. How is it even possible to begin saying what all these works have in 
common?  
Cavell is not especially interested in defining his moral perfectionism, and 
just as it is not settled in advance if a work should count as perfectionist or not, 
it is not settled what features of a perfectionist work amount to its 
perfectionism. Cavell does provide a list of tentatively defining features at two 
places in his oeuvre, however, namely in Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome 
and in Cities of Words (2004).15 In both places he takes as his point of departure 
the perfectionist features he identifies in Plato’s Republic; while these are not 
exhaustive, they can be seen as exemplary of what moral perfectionism at least 
can include. I’ll quote at length from Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: 
“Obvious candidate features are its ideas of a mode of conversation between 
(older and younger) friends, one of whom is intellectually authoritative because 
his life is somehow exemplary or representative of a life the other(s) are 
attracted to and in the attraction of which the self recognizes itself as enchained, 
fixated, and feels itself removed from reality, whereupon the self finds that it 
can turn (convert, revolutionize itself) and a process of education is undertaken, 
in part through a discussion of education, in which each self is drawn on a 
journey of ascent to a further state of that self, where the higher is determined 
not by natural talent but by seeking to know what you are made of and 
cultivating the thing you are meant to do; it is a transformation of the self which 
finds expression in the imagination of a transformation of society into 
something like an aristocracy where what is best for society is a model for and 
is modeled on what is best for the individual soul, a best arrived at in the view 
                                                          
15 See Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, p. 6-7 and Cities of Words. Pedagogical Letters on a Register of 
the Moral Life, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2004, p. 445-447.  
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of a new reality, a realm beyond, the true world, that of the Good, sustainer of 
the good city, of Utopia.”16 These are some of the perfectionist features that 
Cavell finds in Plato’s Republic. Now, while it is clear that a work can count as 
perfectionist, according to Cavell, without having all of these features, part of 
my reason for quoting them here is that I was surprised to find that every single 
one of them applies to Musil’s The Man without Qualities. I’m not going to go 
slavishly through all of them in what follows, as if to show that they fit one to 
one with the plot and the themes in Musil’s novel (although I think they do), 
but just want to note my initial intuition that The Man without Qualities is 
obviously a moral perfectionist work in Cavell’s sense.  
Before turning to Musil, I would like to say a few words about one of 
Cavell’s key perfectionist texts, one to which he returns repeatedly and which 
he also links to his readings of the Hollywood films, namely Ibsen’s A Doll’s 
House (1879). This is especially relevant for my purposes, since Ibsen’s play and 
Musil’s novel share many concepts and themes; in fact, Musil’s female 
protagonist, Agathe, could be said to provide an answer to the question so often 
asked about Ibsen’s Nora, the question as to where she went when she left her 
husband. (Agathe moves in with her brother Ulrich, the male protagonist, and 
falls in love with him!) According to Cavell, Ibsen’s A Doll’s House discusses a 
wide range of perfectionist concepts, among them “the concepts of 
conversation, education, happiness, becoming human, fathers and husbands, 
brother and sister, scandal, becoming strangers, fitness for teaching, playtime, 
honor, the miracle of change, journey or departure, the bond of marriage.”17 
(Again I note how well all of these concepts fit The Man without Qualities.) In A 
Doll’s House, what Nora discovers and what causes her outrage and her shame 
is that her marriage is only legally a marriage, not genuinely; she realizes that she 
has been living a doll’s life or a child’s life, not the life of a grown-up woman, 
let alone her own life, and this brings her to leave her husband and her children 
to seek an education for herself, that is, to seek herself. This is at one and the 
same time a criticism of her husband, of the institution of marriage, and of 
society, a criticism so harsh that it would, according to Nora, call for a miracle 
                                                          
16 Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, p. 6-7.  
17 Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, p. 109. See also Pursuits of Happiness. The Hollywood Comedy of 
Remarriage, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1981, p. 22.  
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of change or transformation if she were to come to live in a genuine marriage 
with her husband. Perhaps this also makes it clearer why the concept of 
marriage is so important to Cavellian perfectionism; apart from invoking the 
philosophical tradition of thinking about friendship and love, and certainly 
invoking the extensive treatment of marriage in the writings of Kierkegaard, for 
Cavell marriage is the acute point where the most intimate and personal of 
relationships meets society and its institutions, so that one could paraphrase 
Cavell as saying that if genuine marriage succeeds, then there is hope for society. 
As a matter of fact, the question of marriage also plays a central role in The Man 
without Qualities. To sum up, what the case of Nora in A Doll’s House shows is 
that even when morality has had its say and no specific wrong is claimable, there 
are still ethical or perfectionist considerations left to discuss, or, if conversation 
is not possible, to act upon.18  
I now come to Musil and The Man without Qualities. This huge modernist 
novel, similar in scope and radicality only to the novels of Proust and Joyce, is 
rarely treated extensively by philosophers of literature, so I can hardly blame 
Cavell for not taking it up, but I may be allowed to express my regret that he 
has not done so. As a trained philosopher, Musil was deeply influenced by 
Nietzsche and Emerson (although the influence of Emerson is not yet as well 
established as that of Nietzsche); he was a contemporary of Wittgenstein’s, 
breathing the same empiricist or positivist air of early 20th-century Vienna and 
reacting similarly against it by leaving philosophy and turning to literature; some 
of his most important concepts in The Man without Qualities, for instance the very 
idea of being without qualities and the idea of ‘seinesgleichen’ or ‘the like of it’, 
show striking similarities with some of Heidegger’s concepts in Being and Time 
(most notably, with the concepts of ‘Eigentlichkeit’/’Uneigentlichkeit’ and ‘das 
Man’), and last but not least, there is an unacknowledged debt on Musil’s part 
to Kierkegaard’s treatment of subjectivity, ethics, and religion.19 I drop all these 
names in order to say that Musil has affinities and similarities with many of the 
thinkers important to Cavell’s formulation of his moral perfectionism, so that 
                                                          
18 Cf. Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, p. 112.  
19 Though Musil did not read much of Kierkegaard, and explicitly stated that he did not like 
Either/Or, his way of dismissing morality in favor of a higher ethics or religiosity has striking 
similarities with Kierkegaard’s “teleological suspension of the ethical” in Fear and Trembling.  
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The Man without Qualities also in this respect would fit easily into a growing canon 
of perfectionist works. Musil himself stated on several occasions, in his journals 
and in interviews, that the intent of the book was ethical; he even said that he 
wanted it to “deliver material for a new morality”,20 and he never tired of 
stressing the link between literature and ethics, seeing literature as the right 
medium for describing genuine ethical experience and aspiration, as opposed 
to modern philosophy’s traditional focus on universal moral rules and 
principles.  
Apart from this overt declaration of ethical intention, The Man without 
Qualities shows an abundance of ethical themes and subplots, from the 
protagonist Ulrich, who is in search of an answer to the Socratic question of 
how one should live, over the psychopathic murderer Moosbrugger, who 
violates the fifth commandment but is nonetheless innocently sentenced to 
death, and to the incestuous relationship between Ulrich and Agathe and their 
forgery of their father’s will (here is another parallel with Ibsen which is hardly 
accidental). In fact, almost all the characters in The Man without Qualities can be 
said to be at some point in conflict with prevailing morality, one way or another, 
but at the same time they are often shown to be justified from an ethical or, we 
could say, perfectionist perspective, or if not justified, then at least 
psychologically understandable and thus halfway excused. The novel is divided 
into two very different volumes, the first of which is called “The like of it 
happens” (or at least this is how I prefer to translate the German 
“Seinesgleichen geschieht”). I think it can be argued that this volume constitutes 
the negative part of Musil’s literary ethics, in the sense that it is mainly a critique 
of society and its morality; it is centered around the so called “parallel 
campaign”, an initiative by some of the leading figures of bourgeois Vienna to 
plan the celebration of the Austrian emperor in 1918 (little do they know that 
the emperor will be dead and the empire dissolved by that time), but 
unfortunately the “campaign” is completely unable to make a decision and take 
action and is instead exhibited in all its fake idealism and moral hypocrisy. 
Incidentally, this is perfectly in line with Cavellian perfectionism, which stresses 
                                                          
20 In an interview with Oskar Maurus Fontana from 1926.  
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the critique of prevailing morality and every kind of moralism as one of its 
central aims.  
The second part of The Man without Qualities is called “Into the Millennium” 
and has the subtitle “The Criminals”. As I interpret the novel, this second 
volume is where Musil sets forth his positive ethical alternative to the morality 
he has criticized in the first volume (and continues to criticize here). At the 
beginning of this second book, Ulrich is united with his forgotten sister Agathe 
at their father’s funeral, and the novel now turns into an unusual love story, 
giving Musil the opportunity to describe the ethical experience of love as if for 
the first time, that is, without banality, because of the reader’s acute awareness 
that what he or she is witnessing borders on incest. From a perfectionist 
perspective, this second book is probably the most interesting of the two; it 
consists to a great extent of dialogues between Ulrich and Agathe, seemingly 
endless conversations on morality, religion, love, education, marriage, 
childhood, and many other ethically relevant themes. Part of the interest is of 
course due to the fact that Ulrich and Agathe are the novel’s obvious heroes; 
they are the man and the woman without qualities, persons of possibility rather 
than reality who are willing to experiment and change themselves and their lives 
in order to grow as human beings. This is just another way of saying that the 
second book constitutes the positive part of Musil’s literary ethics. But to see 
how Ulrich transforms in the course of the novel, how he develops from an 
ironic skepticist into a romantic with religious aspirations, it is worth going back 
to the beginning of the novel.  
When we first meet Ulrich, he is a disillusioned mathematician with strong 
philosophical inclinations and a mistress who is really a prostitute. We are told 
that he has made three attempts to become an important man, namely in the 
military, as an engineer, and now as a mathematician, but that none of them has 
been successful, mainly because Ulrich has been unable to identify with the 
occupation in question. Musil is clearly playing with the genre of the 
‘Bildungsroman’ here; already on page 47 he lets Ulrich give up the idea of 
becoming an important man and decide to “take a year’s holiday from his life”21 
                                                          
21 Robert Musil: The Man without Qualities, trans. Sophie Wilkins, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1995, 
p. 44.  
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in order to find out what, or rather who, he really wants to be. In the first book 
Ulrich is in a more or less permanent crisis as to what direction his life should 
take (I merely note here that the concept of crisis is also defining for Cavellian 
perfectionism); he has erotic relationships, or at least potentially erotic 
relationships, with all the important female characters of the novel, so that the 
prostitute Leona is followed by the married nymphomaniac Bonadea, while he 
considers marriage with the frigid Gerda, is attracted to the close friend and 
Nietzsche-follower Clarisse, and flirts with his cousin, the beautiful idealist 
Diotima.22 The purpose of all these relationships is to prepare and set up a 
contrast to his later relationship with Agathe; paradoxically, the life with Agathe, 
his sister and therefore similar other, is the closest Ulrich gets to a marriage, or 
rather, after describing all his erotic adventures and Agathe’s humiliating 
marriage with her husband Hagauer, Musil postulates their relationship as an 
example of what genuine marriage is.  
Interestingly, the core concept of the novel, namely the concept of being 
without qualities, also has strong affinities with Cavellian perfectionist 
concerns. Cavell sometimes refers to Heidegger when explaining that human 
beings and their actions cannot be reduced to their qualities and their deeds; he 
even talks about the power of subjectivity being absorbed by ones qualities or 
deeds.23 In Musil scholarship references are usually made to Meister Eckhart, 
but the idea is basically the same: What I am does not equal who I am or, as 
Cavell puts it, “I am not exhausted by all the definitions or descriptions the 
world gives of me to me”.24 Ulrich’s and Agathe’s being without qualities does 
not mean that they do not have any qualities; it means that they do not identify 
with the qualities they obviously have, that they know they are more than or 
beyond their qualities. This is related to another important concept of the novel, 
the concept of possibility or potentiality. Ulrich is said to have a sense of 
possibility as opposed to a sense of reality – what this means is simply that he 
is able to imagine that he himself and the world around him could be different, 
                                                          
22 Proper names are important in Musil, as is the fact of their origin. ‘Leona’, ‘Bonadea’, and 
‘Diotima’ are names Ulrich has invented for his mistresses, the last one ironically referring to 
Plato’s Symposium. Contrariwise, ‘Agathe’ is his sister’s real name which suggests that we should take 
its Greek meaning (agathós = good) seriously.  
23 Cf. Cities of Words, p. 258.  
24 The Claim of Reason, p. 390.  
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and indeed better, that is, that change is possible. Consequently, along with his 
critique of the prevailing order of society, Ulrich proposes a series of utopias 
(another perfectionist concept!) which correspond to his own development. 
The first of these is called “the utopia of precision” and is modeled on the 
natural sciences in a rather positivist spirit; the next is called “the utopia of 
essayism” and is modeled on the genre of the essay with its mixture of 
subjectivity and objectivity and its tendency towards experimentation, whereas 
the last one is called “the utopia of the other condition” and is concerned with 
some sort of ecstatic, religious experience. In the second volume of the novel 
this ‘other condition’ gains increasing importance as Ulrich and Agathe set out 
to explore it systematically, in order to see if it is possible to live in it 
permanently. As I read the novel, this is to be taken seriously as a genuine 
openness to religious experience, so that it is legitimate to talk about something 
very similar to a conversion on the part of Ulrich and Agathe; even though ‘the 
other condition’ turns out not to be permanent, it is still shown to be the 
ultimate beginning and end of both morality and ethics, very much like 
religiosity is the ultimate way of life in Kierkegaard.  
It should be clear by now that Musil distinguishes between three different 
dimensions or orders of life, namely the moral, the ethical, and the religious, in 
a way congenial to Cavellian perfectionism. Morality for Musil is social, 
impersonal, and universal, it is rule-based and allows for repetition, whereas 
ethics is individual, personal, and has to do with the exceptions from the rules. 
Like in Cavell, the ethical dimension is brought into play when morality falls 
short of grasping the situation in question. This can lead to conflicts between 
morality and ethics such as in the cases of Nora in A Doll’s House and 
Moosbrugger and Ulrich and Agathe in The Man without Qualities. I think it can 
be argued that these characters stand in the tradition of ‘good criminals’ 
(remember that the subtitle of the second book was exactly “The Criminals”, 
referring undoubtedly to Ulrich and Agathe); their actions are definitely wrong 
from the perspective of morality, but justified or at least forgivable from an 
ethical perspective. Like in Cavell, and before him in Emerson, Nietzsche, and 
Kierkegaard, the idea is that there is something higher than morality; Musil even 
lets Ulrich quote Emerson to Agathe, saying that “The virtues of society are 
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vices of the saint”.25 As I understand it, this means that morality is not required 
if the ethical state has been attained, and that ethics is not required if the 
religious state has been attained – each further state or order encompasses the 
former one.  
Finally, a word about the love of Ulrich and Agathe. This is certainly a 
violation of the law from the perspective of morality, but from an ethical or 
metaphorical perspective it is an image of spiritual, non-appetitive love with 
clear religious undertones. The kinship and so the affinity between Ulrich and 
Agathe is shown to be the condition of possibility for their love, so that Musil 
could be said to introduce a new ethical category, that of ‘the similar other’. In 
this way, on the one hand he avoids that their love ends in narcissism (a 
common reading), and on the other hand that ‘the other’ is conceived as 
radically other, like for instance in Levinas. Furthermore, Musil shows how love 
of the self in the Aristotelian sense of ‘philautia’, or care for the self, is a 
precondition for love of others in the Christian sense of ‘charity’. Even though 
Cavell does not invoke the concept of ‘philautia’, as far as I know, he does 
invoke Foucault’s care for the self, so that this line of thought in Musil also 
seems very congenial to Cavellian moral perfectionism.26  
I have promised to elaborate on the scope of Cavell’s perfectionism, so let 
me do that briefly now. This is no easy task because Cavell’s work so strongly 
resists systematization. Looking again at the list of perfectionist works in 
Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, with its juxtaposition of philosophy and 
literature, and taking into account the diversity of the works Cavell has treated 
extensively over his 50 year career, it can seem almost impossible to say 
anything general about it. The sheer temporal span of the texts, from antiquity 
to high modernism, and the variety of disciplines, genres, and media, from 
philosophy to psychoanalysis, from treatise to poetry, and from tragedy to film, 
seems to exclude unification or categorization. It is true that there is a 
predominance of romanticist and modernist texts (though, as I said, not of 
modernist novels), but then again there is the intense focus on Shakespeare, the 
late interest in realist and naturalist authors like Austen, Dickens, and James, 
                                                          
25 The Man without Qualities, p. 756. The quotation is from Emerson’s essay Circles.  
26 Cf. Philosophy the Day after Tomorrow, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2005, p. 120.  
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and, in philosophy, the occupation with such unromantic thinkers as Kant and 
Mill. So perhaps it is better to think of perfectionism as a genre or a theme, as 
Cavell himself in fact does. What is this theme? I would say that one very 
important aspect of it is what the Germans call ‘Bildung’, hence also my 
reference to the ‘Bildungsroman’, so that works written within this tradition or 
under this headline will be perfectionist in Cavell’s sense. This is hardly anything 
new, but it does keep the scope of perfectionism open, since ‘Bildungsromane’, 
and films in this genre, are still written today. Another very important aspect of 
perfectionism is its necessity as a criticism of morality. As Cavell notes, morality 
always runs the danger of stagnating and turning into moralism, and therefore 
perfectionism is always potentially relevant as an alternative and more 
encompassing perspective. Similarly, every time old moral values are left behind 
and new ones are called for, perfectionist thinking is activated. (This seems to 
be where modernist novels come in – think, apart from Musil, of Hermann 
Broch, Kafka, and Rilke, to name only a few writing in German.) And finally, 
perfectionism seems to be the opposite of nihilism and skepticism; it is a way 
of thinking insisting on hope even in the midst of crisis or, paradoxically, 
insisting on hope because of crisis, so that, in Cavell’s own work, his treatment 
of skepticism and perfectionism, respectively, could be considered as two sides 
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